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Narcissus and the Echo of Emptiness
Steven W. Laycock
University ofToledo
Toledo, Ohio, USA

The passion of Echo and the rejection of Narcissus constitute a paradoxical unity.
Echo has the last word. Her word is reflective, distanced, merely descriptive.
Narcissus, engaged perception, cannot speak. For speech and concept assume
disengagement. Echo gives voice to the silence of Narcissus, and cannot exist
without it. Yet the word "silence" breaks silence. Echo conceives the inconceivable
as "inconceivable," and lapses into paradox. Narcissus enters into the inconceivable
without conceptual distance. Far from "narcissistic," in the ordinary sense,
Narcissus is not in love with ''himself," but with what, for him, is the other. His
engagement with the "other" precludes self-obsession. For the eye, there is no eye.
And for Narcissus, there is no Narcissus. The dualism of subject and object collapses
into the ineffable experience that Echo articulates.

"I

N THE end," Salis (1988) tells us, Echo is
"nothing but the words of others, a voice
that is the death of the living voice" (p.
85). This is undeniably so. But we must seek a
deeper specification of that death. Juno punishes
the loquacious Echo for concealing her husband's
dalliance with the Nymphs by depriving her of
the originary capacity of voice: ''You shall forfeit
the use of that tongue with which you have
cheated me, except for that one purpose you are
so fond of-reply. You shall still have the last word,
but no power to speak the first" (Bulfinch, 1979,
p. 101). Receiving what she loved most, Echo
became a shade, a sound-shadow, "nothing but
the words of others," to be sure, but also the last
word, the final word, a word to follow all words.
We cannot "say," we cannot originate, a word
without that word being subsumed, surpassed by
its Echo. But to credit Merleau-Ponty's (1969)
insight, philosophy "does not seek a verbal
substitute for the world we see, it does not
transform it into something said, it does not install
itself in the order ofthe said ... " (p. 4). Echo is not
merelytherepetitionoftheword, the [re]sounding
of the word, but the substitution of the word for

the world. Echo is heard when, instead of
perceiving the rich and extraordinary presence
before us, bursting with dynamism and possibility,
engaging our vital attention through the negative
pressure of its interrogative being, we pronounce,
and thereby substitute, the pedestrian word
"table." "Table" is the last word-a word of finality
and death. It supplants living presence. To ''know"
that this is a table is to presume that all of our
questions about it have been answered, to
foreclose exploration, and replenish interrogativity
with the solid density of a presumed answer. Echo
puts an end to all questioning. But for MerleauPonty (1969), "the existing world exists in the
interrogative mode" (p. 103). The world is a
question, and everything in it. The things of our
world beckon us to awaken to them. The question
is the heart of the mind. But when Echo is heard,
the question grows cold, and the mind dies. It is
here that the spirit of Buddhism is felt as
liberation from the mind-death of Echo. For
Buddhism refuses to assume the finality of any
purported "answer." No word ever deposits itself
at the heart of experience without bursting into a
thousand questions. "Beginner's mind" is
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unending attunement with the openness and
interrogativity of experience. Every answer brings
forth new questions. But more than this. An
answer cannot be understood independently of the
questions to which it responds. Response is
resolved once again into question, as question is
resolved into response. And there is no last word,
no Echo. "I -don't-know mind" renders the calcified
assumptions of an all-too-solid knowledge into the
fluidity of curiosity and wonder. The world we
experientially inhabit is not populated by
densities and solidities that would fill up the gaps
in our knowledge. Our relationship to the world
is not one of repletion, but of an ever-renewed
opening and emptying.
Though she brings death to the unwary, the
unaware, the unawakened, Echo has a more
benign appointment. Salis (1988) comments that,
in Echo:
... the voice is drawn out into a space which,
rather than being simply filled by the sound
of the voice, claims it and in a sense takes
possession of it. Here there is a spacing that
disperses the voice while also giving back its
sound, that multiplies it while also letting its
sound echo back as if from other voices.
Hearing the echo, one then experiences silence,
not as the mere opposite of speech or sound
but as the open space of the voice. (p. 86)

Echo "claims" voice as shadow owns its lightdenying opacity. And to the extent that possession
is self-investment, the very self of Echo is the
living originary word, and more broadly, the live
interrogative being, that it otherwise comes to
supplant. The [re]sounding of sound invests itself,
invests its self, in the primacy of sound. Echo is
not only a parasite, living off the originary voice.
Her very being is this voice. The death-of-the-voice
could not exist without her prey. But in preying
upon the voice, she preys upon herself. Just as
desire would extinguish itself in its fulfillment
without affirming itself as desire, so Echo must
affirm the living word that she denies and brings
to an end. She returns life to her victim. Sound is
heard afresh in the cavernous space in which it is
surpassed. And Echo, like the wrathful visage of
a benevolent deity, pronounces upon sound and
its [re] sounding, the beneficence of silence.
Echo and Narcissus, whom she passionately
pursues, form a dyad, if not a couple. The two are
united as much by Narcissus' rejection as by
110

Echo's passionate attachment. For rejection
preserves the form of the rejected. And Echo is
nothing but form. Echo is the death of voice.
Narcissus-the "death flower" (from narkao) that
opens the doors to the underworld-is the death
of the eye. Gazing into a fountain of water, dear
as silver, Narcissus beheld what the stories
account to be "himself," and fell deeply in love
with his "own" image. "He brought his lips near
to take a kiss; he plunged his arms in to embrace
the beloved object. It fled at the touch, but
returned again after a moment and renewed the
fascination" (Bulfinch, 1979, p. 102). It is easy to
assume that Narcissus fell victim to the perennial
error of mistaking appearance for reality. The
image appeared to be an other, but-in realitywas himself. We are bemused and smug at the
parakeet's similar error. It is said-we say-that
the parakeet sees "itself' in the mirror and takes
the image to be a :rival bird. But again, this is our
projection. This could serve as an adequate
description of the parakeet's experience only if,
at some level of cognition deeper than the optional
construal, it knew that the image was itself. But
neither we nor the parakeet, and certainly not
Narcissus, could know what is not, and cannot
be true. The logic of mirroring assumes an
ineluctable distinction between original and
reflection. Image is not object. And I can never be
my reflection. In this respect, Narcissus and the
parakeet command the better part of wisdom. In
the Zen tradition it is said that the eye cannot
see itself. And this is true even if we gaze into the
image-eyes that peer back at us from the other
side of the mirror. For the eye, there is no eye.
That is not me, but a reflection of me. Narcissus
could not, then, have mistakenly assumed that
what was really himself was another. What
greeted him in the silver waters was undeniably
the appearance of an other. But we cannot say
that it was really himself.
Bulfinch's (1979) interpretation of the
Narcissus' predicament is classic: "He fell in love
with himself' (p. 102). Thus, narcissism is simply
self-love. But we know that this could not be the
case. He fell in love with an image (that was
already other to the original)-an image that
appeared, moreover, to be an other. Edinger (1992)
proposes that "Narcissus represents the alienated
ego that cannot love ... because it is not yet related
to itself. To fall in love with the reflected image of
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oneself can only mean that one does not yet
p~ssess oneself' (p. 161). But if the fervent

outpouring ofNarcissus' love was directed toward
what, for him, was other, we cannot say that he
was incapable oflove. Nor can we say that he could
not love another. For certainly he did love another
in a sense far more genuine than one who-unlike
Narcissus-would recognize the image as an
image and nonetheless maintain the outpouring
of "love." Prescinding from the postulated
cognitive error, Narcissus' love was undeniably
authentic. Narcissus was not "narcissistic" in the
sense of being given to excesses of self-love. But
neither did he fall into "a frustrated state of
yearning for a self-possession which does not yet
exist" (Edinger, 1992, p. 161). His yearning was
yearning for another, not for himself. It is only
we, not Narcissus, who, in placing ourselves above
the situation, see that the "object" of his desire
was his own reflection. That is not Narcissus'
experience, but our own. And if narcissism, either
as excess or as deficiency of authentic self-love, is
possible at all, it is not possible for Narcissus, but
only for those who, like ourselves, have the
capacity to extricate ourselves from the
immediacy of the experience, and survey the
situation from the altitude of reflection.
The suggestive title of Golomb's book, Trapped
in the Mirror (1992), might seem to offer a better
description. Unlike Alice, for whom the looking
glass was a portal, a passage to a world beyond,
an opening, and thus a freeing, for a world of
magical, perhaps surreal, semblance, Narcissus
could be depicted as imprisoned within the
domain of semblance. But again, we must query
whether this describes the experience ofNarcissus
or that of the reflective spectator. Being "trapped"
implies an impediment to our will, a resistance, a
desire to get out, to break down the walls, rupture
the enclosure. If Narcissus had felt himself
trapped, we should expect from him an effort to
return from semblance to reality. But this, we
know, is not how the story goes. Narcissus' efforts
were directed, rather, toward uniting with the
semblance-or from his perspective, toward
uniting with the elusive, vanishing other. For
Narcissus, the face in the waters was real, not
apparent. He had not fallen in love with a
reflection-and certainly not with himself.
Neither from his perspective nor from the vantage
point of reflection can we say that he himself was

"trapped" in the mirror. In the immediacy of his
own experience, desire reached out to an other.
And the mediated standpoint of reflection refuses
to surrender the distinction between original and
image.
The lovely, and probably apocryphal, Zen story
of the "transmission of the lamp," the succession
from Hung-jen, the fifth, to Hui-neng, the sixth
ancestral teacher of the Zen tradition, puts
Narcissus in proper perspective. Hung-jen knew
that he would soon pass from this life, and
determined that his successor would be the one
whose insight, expressed in verse, was most
trenchant. Shen-hsiu, a senior monk, highly
regarded among the monastic community,
composed the following gatha:
The body is the Bodhi Tree.
The mind a stand of mirror bright.
Take care to wipe it continually,
And never allow the dust to light.

Hui-neng, a simple rice-pounder ofhumble origins
of whom no one would have expected great insight
matched the first poem with his own:
There never was a Bodhi Tree,
Nor stand of mirror bright.
Originally, not one thing exists,
So where is the dust to light?

The story is much richer than I am able to convey
here, and the need for interpretation much more
extensive (see Laycock, 1994, for a more extensive
interpretation). But much can be learned from
confining ourselves to the ''bright mirror" of the
two poems. For Shen-hsiu, the mind is (like) a
mirror. And Hui-neng retracts the analogue.
"There never was a, .. mirror bright." The two
poems seem-on the surface-to contradict one
another. But this interpretation is blocked by the
surrounding narrative. Were the two poems to
stand in a simple relationship of frontal
contradiction, then one would be true, and the
other unproblematically false. But Shen-hsiu's
poem was not simply "false." For on awaking in
the morning, the old master called his disciples,
had incense burned before the poem, praised it,
and declared that whoever should put the poem
into practice would surely attain enlightenment.
One cannot assume that such veneration would
be heaped upon claims that the master knew to
be false. But if not reciprocally contradictory, are
Narcissus and the Echo ofEmptiness
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the poems then equally true-perhaps true from
alternative standpoints, the one true from the
perspective of practice, the other, from the
perspective of attainment? But again, this si:rJ!ple
relativism of respect is impeded by the narrative.
For after all, Hui-neng did win the succession.
If neither is false, and yet the two are not
equally true, are they then "unequally'' true? Is
Hui-neng's insight "truer"? What did Hui-neng see
that Shen-hsiu missed? On deeper consideration,
Hui-neng's line, "There never was a Bodhi Tree,"
does not refute its mate, but rather amplifies it,
displays its significance. If the mind is, indeed,
like a mirror, then it must be mirror-like in the
respect that, for the mirror, there is no mirror.
The mirror reflects the color and form of whatever
stands before it. But in principle, the one thing
that the mirror cannot reflect is itself. Placing one
mirror in front of another, what is reflected in the
first is not "itself," but a reflection of itself. At least
we, who observe from the outside, must say as
much. But what would the mirror say? Does the
mirror "confuse" itself with its mirrored
representation? Does it identify "itself' with the
reflected image? Does it make a "cognitive"
mistake? The eye cannot see itsel£ And "Even the
sharpest sword cannot cut itself; the finger-tips
cannot be touched by the same finger-tips. Citta
[mind] does not know itself' (Murti, 1987, pp. 317318). The mirror cannot (incorrectly) identify
itself, confuse itself, with its image, since, for
"itself," there is no "itself." The "self' ("itself') of
the mirror is exactly its self-effacement. Its
presence, to "itself," is exactly its absence. It is
not simply that the mirror is self-effacing, that
the mirror "itself' effaces itself, but that the
presence of the mirror is exactly its ineluctable
absence. To see it is exactly not to see it in
deference to its reflection. For the mirror, selfidentification is unthinkable. It cannot, in
principle, identify itself with its image, because
there is no "itself." In this respect, we credit
Wittgenstein's (197 4) recognition that "to say of
two things that they are identical is nonsense,
and to say of one thing that it is identical with
itself is to say nothing at all" (p. 52: 5.5303). For
the mirror, the mirror and its reflection are not
two, original and reflection. But they are also not
one (in contrast to two). To count-even to oneis to assume an external vantage point. From the
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standpoint of the mirror, its image is numberless,
trans ordinal.
From the standpoint of the mirror, also, there
is no relationship, and certainly not a "relation,"
that spans or unifies the purported duality of
original and representation. Relationship is a
phenomenon of the disengaged, third-personal
perspective. From its own standpoint, the mirror
does not stand in a relationship of representation,
identification, even openness, to a purported
"other." There is no "other." This is not to assume
that there is only the mirror. For the mirror, to be
is exactly not to be for itself. Dogen Zenji, the great
thirteenth-century master of the Soto Zen
tradition, declared that "Since there is no mind
in me, when I hear the sound of raindrops from
the eaves, the raindrop is myself' (in Kotoh, 1987,
p. 206). But this is not to say that a mirror-like
mind identifies "itself" with the raindrops. Rather,
the only "self," the only self-presence, that mind
could in any way possess is the presence of the
raindrops. And if subjectivity cannot be
experienced as such, then the content of our
experience cannot be described as "objects."
"Narcissus," then, names the openness in
which being appears. But this openness is never
objectifiable, never a being. And we can speak of
openness and that which comes to fill it only from
an external point of view. For Narcissus, there is
no openness. For Narcissus, there is no Narcissus.
And a fortiori, for Narcissus, there is no Narcissus
in passionate, futile pursuit of ''himself." Indeed,
Narcissus could not see the image in the silvery
waters as himself. For the hermeneutic "as"
entails a certain distantiation, a certain steppingback, that enables a peripheral glimpse of the
object that we construe under a given interpretive
form. But the "self'-Narcissus ''himself'-can
never be glimpsed in this way. The image can
never be seen "as" himself or "as" another. And
the supposition that Narcissus is "narcissistic" is
thereby cut off.
Are we, then, who stand outside, we outsiders,
to be accounted wrong in our construal that
Narcissus sees his own image? Is reflective
consciousness that situates itself outside the event
that it observes to be accounted wrong in its
postulation of an intentional relationship
spanning subject and object? In Merleau-Ponty's
(1969) insightful confession, "I should say that
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there was there a thing perceived and an openness
upon this thing which the reflection has
neutralized and transformed into perceptionreflected-on and thing-perceived-within-aperception-reflected-on" (p. 38). Perception is not
perception-reflected-on. Nor is the perceived the
thing-perceived-within-a-perception-reflected-on.
Far from laying bare what was there from the
beginning, [dis] closing an intrinsic but
unrecognized structure oflive perception, reflection
changes the subject. And we, as outsiders, are
likewise incapable of seeing what Narcissus sees
and seeing as he sees. But again, are we "wrong''?
For surely, if we are, then Narcissus is "right."
Who sees the image the right way? Narcissus does
not see an image at all. Who sees the elusive
youth the right way? We do not see the youth at
all! And we can only say that the two points of
view-the engaged and the disengaged-are
incommensurable. We are not subject to delusive
appearance. But neither are we "right." We simply
cannot see what Narcissus sees without being
engaged as Narcissus is engaged. The appearance/
reality schema has no work to do here.
Nagel's (1979) famous question, ''What is it like
to be a bat?" might first be met with speculations
concerning what it would be like for usintelligent, human, humanoid-to be bats. We can
imagine ourselves hanging upside down for hours,
spreading our wings, flying blindly by sonar
through a dark cave and eating bugs. But this
does not respond to Nagel's question. Nagel asks
what it is like for the bat to be a bat. And this
question, if properly understood, is met by
uncomprehending silence. We simply have no
idea. The bat is a question mark. And any attempt
to resolve or diminish its interrogativity is
inevitably the insertion of our own perspective
into the scene, and therefore a change of subject.
Parsons (1976) observes that, "We continuously
seek closure in our meanings and identities, yet
we cannot tolerate the constrictions they lay upon
us ... " (p. 3). But our intolerance is hopeless. We
live in a world of question marks. Narcissus is a
question mark. What is it like to be a snail? A
grasshopper? A carrot? What is it like to be
Narcissus? We see as he sees only by becoming
him, by ceasing to be what we are: outsiders.
But the issue is deeper still. Despite Sartre's
(1971) postulation that the question is posed "on

the basis of a preinterrogative familiarity with
being'' (p. 35), we must say, with regard to the
question marks that inhabit our experience, that
"no answer ever preceded the question ... "
(Bataille, 1988, p. 36). The interrogative precedes
the assertoric. And even thought, which purports
to concern itselfwith the formulation of truth, is
"suspended in the daze of the question" (Gillan,
1980, p. 142). In the enigmatic pronouncement of
Fa-yen Wen-i, "Not knowing most closely
approaches the Truth" (Chang, 1971, p. 239). It
is the question, not the answer, that is the "truth."
Thus, in Burke's admonition:
This question-knowing provides a reflective
and intuitive access to Being which
philosophers of intuition and reflection quickly
sought to close up by trying to prove that the
answer was already contained in the question;
for them the "meaning'' of Being was prior to
the question, for it was contained a priori in
the mind ... (Burke, 1990, p. 88)

But a question that embraces its own answer is
not a genuine question, but rather a rhetorical
ploy. The question is a modality of openness.
Sartre (1971) tells us that questioning is
conditioned by "the non-being ofknowing in man"
(p. 36). Agacinski (1991) writes that "the status
of the subject is inseparable from the status of
the question" (p. 9).And in Merleau-Ponty's (1969)
radicalized observation, ''we ourselves are one sole
continued question" (p. 103). But if so, then to
the extent and in the respect that we are
openness, we are not the saturating opacity of
response. To the extent and in the respect that
the nonbeing of knowing conditions us, we are
not, then, conditioned by a quasi-indicative preinterrogative familiarity with being. And if we
genuinely are interrogative openness, then we
cannot look "within" for the answer. For there is
nothing to see. The authentic question is an abyss
without hope of repletion.
There are two types of question and two types
of answer. There are genuinely open questions
that absorb their answers into themselves,
suspending, engulfing them, in the free and
boundless space ofinterrogativity. And there are
the tight, contoured pockets of delimited openness
that call for remainderless saturation. Responses
float in interrogative space. Information fills it
up, abolishes it. And to say, with Merleau-Ponty
Narcissus and the Echo ofEmptiness
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(1969), that philosophy "does not raise questions
and does not provide answers that would little by
little :fill in the blanks" (p. 105), is to say that
philosophy opens itself to response, not to
information. It may be, as Sartre (1971) tells us,
that "the question is a kind of expectation; I expect
a reply from the being questioned" (p. 35). But
repletion is the death of the question, the death
of ourselves as questions. And questioning is the
life of the mind. If the "reply" expected were
information, then questioning would be suicide.
But "the interrogative is not a mode derived by
inversion or by reversal of the indicative ... "
(Merleau-Ponty, 1969, p. 129). And this is because
genuine questioning cannot be decisively put to
rest. There is no last word-no Echo.
What is it like to be Narcissus? What is it like
to kneel at the water's edge and to see as Narcissus
sees? We who stand outside, we outsiders, can
assume Narcissus' place only by importing the
structures that inform our observations, the
contrast of original and representation. We can
construe our projection only in this light. We have
never been bats. But we have all kneU at the
water's edge. We, as reflective observers, have all
been engaged in immediate, prereflective life. And
while our reflective stance provides no insight,
our recollections do. We can collect ourselves,
[re]collect, [re]member. In the rich suggestions of
the German, we can enact Er-innerung: a
deepened interiorization, a gathering, a drawing
inward. Sati, the Pali for "mindfulness" or
"awareness" still supports the resonance of the
Sanskrit smriti which connotes remembrance, a
keeping-in-mind. Presence of mind is rich with
overlarded layers of the passed and the past.
Presence is alive with absence. And it is because
we are capable of gathering the petals of
experience that have fallen along our path that
we outsiders know what it is like not yet to be
"outside." And we are capable of comparing the
womb of immediacy with the domain of postparturition alienation. We know that Narcissus
does not see an "image," that, in his experience,
there is no "relationship" to the other, and in fact,
that there is no "other" at all-for there is no
"same." Merleau-Ponty (1969) is correct in his
assessment that, "We must, at the beginning,
eschew notions such as 'acts of consciousness,'
'matter,' 'form,' and even 'image' and 'perception' "
(p. 129). "At the beginning," in Narcissus' original
114

perception, there is no perception at all! In the
words of Hui-neng's poem, "originally [ben lai],
not one thing exists [wu i wu] ." The "beginning,"
the "origin," is not to be understood as a
fundament, a principium, an arche. It is not the
first element in a continuing series, but is rather
transordinal. With resolvable paradox, we can say
that the origin is exactly the absence of origin.
And original awareness, as the repudiation of selfreflexivity, is the very absence of "itself" as the
founding element of the subject/object order. Sati,
the in-gathering of the mind in presence, is the
[re]collection that, from this "original" stance,
there :is no origin, no mind, no subject, no self. It
is the realization of anatman. In Merleau-Ponty's
(1969) words, "I do not perceive any more than I
speak ... " (p. 190). Echo cannot truly speak, she
can only repeat. Her words are descriptive,
articulatory, at best expressive, but not creative.
Narcissus cannot speak because, for Narcissus,
there is no speaker. Echo's speech is a non original
articulation of Narcissus' original absence of
speech, "The expression of what is before
expression ... " (p. 167).
We, then, we outsiders, play the part of Shenhsiu. For us, the mind is a mirror. For us, the
mind of Narcissus is mirror posed against a mirror. If this were wrong, Hung-jen would have
driven us away and ripped down our poem. But
we have not yet seen the extraordinary implications of our own external stance. If Narcissus is a
mirror opening onto a mirror, then for Narcissus,
there is no mirror, no image, no Narcissus. We
cannot understand our own alienated description
without being immediately transposed back into
the "origin" (which is no origin). Bresson (1958)
suggests that "The phenomenological description
is at the limit unrealizable and interior experience ineffable" (p. 156). Reflection :is not the
awakening of selfless awareness. But the deepening of reflection inevitably leads in that
direction.
Despite his indifference, his refusal of her
attention, Narcissus forms with Echo a curious
doublet, a "couple." And now we know why.
Narcissus, the "origin," stands in no order of
relationship to "himself" or to an "other." He
rejects Echo. But the rejection is a rejection of
dualistic "relationship." To the extent that his
rejection is specific, what he rejects in Echo is her
inability to attain the originary, her status as
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outsider, onlooker. In Dumery's (1964) view,
philosophy, like a parasite, "always comes after
life. Philosophy is a recovery oflife, but it cannot
be identified with life ... Reflection lives on concrete
life" (pp. 5-6). And Echo is parasitic reflection. But
to this extent, Echo is also reflection unaware of
itself. In Merleau-Ponty's (1969) very different
appreciation, "philosophy is the reconversion of
silence and speech into one another ... " (p. 129).
The external vantage point of the reflective Echo
provides a space of articulation, the possibility of
interpolating the predicative tie between the
objects and qualities of perception. Narcissus
might see a red apple. Echo sees, and says, that
the apple is red. Echo articulates, breaks silence.
But Echo is always pursued by silence. Narcissus,
the immediate, the original, cannot speak. For
discursivity assumes distance. And Narcissus is
not an outsider to his own experience. Hui-neng
converts speech into silence with his realization
that, for the mirror, there is no mirror, and
converts silence into speech with the concomitant
insight that the universal and ineluctable absence
of the mirror is exactly its presence. "Outside" is
converted into "inside," and "inside" into "outside."
Echo becomes Narcissus and Narcissus becomes
Echo. With seeming paradox, it is the negativity
of Narcissus' rejection, his refusal of Echo, that
enables the reconversion of silence into speech and
conversely. If Narcissus had accepted Echo, had
simply validated her reflective description, he
would have taken into his own experience the
polarities of subject and object, original and
derivative, presentation and representation, that
form and inform her analysis. He would, that is,
have become an outsider himself, and, as
Narcissus, would have vanished. The interplay
of Echo and Narcissus is nowhere more evident
than in Merleau-Ponty's (1969) intriguing
exposition of the dance of philosophy:
The philosopher speaks, but this is a weakness
in him, and an inexplicable weakness: he
should keep silent, coincide in silence, and
rejoin in Being a philosophy that is there
ready-made. But yet everything comes to pass
as though he wished to put into words a certain
silence he hearkens to within himself. His
entire "work" is this absurd effort. He wrote
in order to state his contact with Being; he did
not state it, and could not state it, since it is
silence. Then he recommences ... (p. 125)

Echo is condemned to repetition. But Narcissus
is silent. She cannot repeat what he says. But she
can give voice to his silence. She can "make it
say ... what in its silence it means to say ... "
(Merleau-Ponty, 1969, p. 39). And in this way,
"language realizes, by breaking the silence, what
the silence wished and did not obtain" (p. 176). If
phenomenological description expresses ineffable
immediacy, we must also see that "The absence
oflanguage is pregnant with the pure possibility
of all language" (Coward, 1990, p. 101). Caputo
(1993) recognizes that:
"Ineffability" is a high-powered discursive
resource, the product of a language that has
been refined and defined until it is sharp enough
and nuanced enough to announce all this
ineffability. "Unsayability" is a modification of
what is sayable ... By the time one has said that
something is ineffable, or that one cannot say a
thing, one has already been speaking for some
time and one has already said too much. (p. 75)

Echo conceives the inconceivable as inconceivable.
Echo sees that the formless differs from the
formed by its form. As Bataille (1988) says, "the
word silence is still a sound ... " (p. 13). And in
giving form to the formless, determination to the
indeterminate, concept to the inconceivable, Echo
indeed has the last word. But the word is a word
of invitation, a word that beckons us to enter into
the ineffable with Narcissus, as Narcissus.
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